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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ROBERT E. CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs. -

//Ob~
Case No_.

ETHEL T. CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from judgment of the Second District Court fot
Davis County, Honorable Thornley K. Swan, Judge.
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In the Supreme Court

I

of the State of Utah

ROBI£RT E. CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
- vs. -

)Case No. 11049

ETHEL T. CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a divorce action.
DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE IN LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a decree dated July 6,
1966, which provided, among other things, as follows:
1. That the Plaintiff be awarded a decree of divorce

from the Defendant.
2. That the Defendant be awarded the care and
control of two minor children of the parties, and be
awarded the sum of $100.00 per month for each of said
children as support money.
3. That the Defendant is not awarded periodic alimony, but in lieu thereof, the Defendant is awarded the
10al property, together with household furnishings and
t'ixtnrPs then~in, located at 3187 South Crestview Circle,

Bountiful, Utah, free and clear of all claims of the Plain
tiff, but subject to the payment by the Defendant of al!
liens and encumbrances upon the property, and in addi.
tion thereto, the Defendant is awarded a lump sum in
lieu of alimony in the amount of $2,400.00, payable at
the option of the Plaintiff at the rate of $100.00 per
month.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the following portiom
of the decree entered as aforesaid, and a decree in her
favor thereon, as follows:

1. That the decree of divorce be set aside becallSe
it is not supported by the evidence.
2. Adjudging that the Defendant is entitled to
monthly alimony in an amount to be determined by this
Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married in
Palo Alto, California, on the 30th day of August, 1940.
Of the five children born as the issue of said marriage,
two children, Charles, age 12, and Norma, age 15, at
the date of the trial of this matter on June 21, 1966,
were unmarried and residing with the Defendant.
That the Plaintiff refused to consider a reconcili
ation (R. S) and the Dt'fendant did not desire a divorc1
The parties had lived in a home at 3187 South Crest·
vit>w Cirdt> in Bountiful, Utah, for fourteen years prior
to the trial. rrhe Plaintiff valued the home at between
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$10,000.00 and $15,000.00, with a mortgage thereon less
than $4,000.00, with monthly payments of $56.00.
The Plaintiff at the hearing of June 15, 1965, testified, among other things, as follows: That over the
years the parties had worked up an antipathy toward
each other, and that finances had bt~en the main problem.
Plaintiff stated that he ·was employed by the Federal
Horne Loan Bank Board in Washington, D.C. His duties
consisted of examination of savings and loan associations
(R. 8). He is working out of Spokane, Washington. He
is called upon to travel in Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, vVashington, Oregon, Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii
(R. 9).
In his work he receives a per diem of $16.00 when
in the field, that is, outside of Salt Lake City, and when
in Alaska the per diem is $24.00 per day (R. 11).
Plaintiff's health is fairly good (R. 14).
The sum of $240.00 per month is his average expense
for his own personal keep (R. 16). Plaintiff feels that
lw needs $240.00 per month, plus the $16.00 per diem while
he is out of town (R. 23).

In 1964 he drew the per diem of $16.00 for 151 days
(R. 17).
Plaintiff denies that the Defendant is entitled to any
alimony.
He does not know anything about the state of the
DPf<>ndant's health (R. 18). He• stated that the Defend3

ant can type and take shorthand (R. 19).
The Defendant, Ethel Christensen, testified as follows at the hearing of June 15, 1965:
That the parties have three children living with th('
Defendant, two boys and one girl, ages 18, 15 and 12
(R. 30).
That she rec(~ived for the maintenance of the home,
herself and the children during the last year $6,585.30
(R. 32). That during the year 1964 she earned $540.00.
Her health broke in 1962 (R. 36).
That the Plaintiff was out of town the following
number of days during the following years (R. 37) :
1960

189

1961

192 days in 10 months

1963

225 days

1964

71 days in four months

She stated that repairs were a big item in the main·
tenance of the home. 'Everything is falling apart." (R.
44)
She statt~d that the Plaintiff is needed at home (R.
50).
Concerning the state of lwr health, the Defendant
stated that she "has astluna that has developed over
the last couple of years and I have extreme fatigue. I
keep hoping that these are conditions that will become
4

brtter as I get over these mental years but instead they
seem to be becoming worse." (R. 50). She stated that
thr doctor keeps treating her, hoping that she will get
better. Dr. Hicken knows how over-wrought the Defendant becomes when she tries to work and her resistance
gets down. Then she is right back for more medicine.
lfr tdls her to rest more (R. 50). She stated that the
trouhles were chronic things and she does not foresee
any surgery (R. 51).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court said,
among other things :

"I am going to award the house to Mrs. Christensen, the equity in the home, and that will be reflected in a reduction of her alimony and support
money. And that will be a hardship on her because she is put in the position of having to
take less monthly income because she is getting
the home and the household furniture and furnishings." (R. 55)
A decree embodying the above provisions was entered on the 13th day of July, 1965. The Defendant
filed a motion for a new trial which was granted in part,
and on the 21st day of June, 19GG, a second hearing was
held. When the hearing opened, the Court stated:
"The Court has ruled that it would hear the parties on the question of alimony, support money
and property settlement, on the grounds that
there has been a change in the circumstances of
the parties." (R. 2)
'l1he Plaintiff was first called and testified to the
l'ollowing:
5

That the home has a value of $12,000.00 to $14,000.00,
with $4,000.00 owing thereon (R. 5).
The Plaintiff stated that his grounds for divorce
were that the parties were continually quarreling. The
basis of the quarreling was generally money. He said,
"I would say she would start these quarrels. She would
probably say I would start them. They continued the
entire time of our married life." While she did not spend
money on herself, she was very free with the children.
Neither of them could manage the money well, according to the other. The quarreling was a daily occurrencr·
(R. 6). Hardly a day went by but there was arguing
and yelling and screaming back and forth and namecalling, "mostly on my part, because I was incited to
wrath, I would say." (R. 8). "My wife accused me of
not being a good provider." (R. 8)
The Plaintiff stated that he had never enjoyed sex
relations with his wife to any degree. He was asked if
she had ever refused him, to which he answered, "I
don't recall." (R. 9)
Plaintiff stated that on one occasion Defendant had
inferred that he was an adulterer. He was asked what
she said at that time, to which he answered, "I can't
recall." (R. 9, 10)
The Plaintiff was asked the following question an<l
gave the following answer:
"Mr. Christensen, do yon have any present intent
to n~::,;ume your marital relationship with Mrs.
Christensen?"

A. "I have no intention of ever spending a minute with that woman." (R. 10)
Plaintiff was asked the follo-wing question and gave
the following answer :

d
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"Has Mrs. Christensen ever used abusive language toward you?"
A. "No, she has not, but I have toward her. I
am sure of that." (R. 12)
He stated that his civil service rating was Grade 9
(R. 16).

On cross-examination the Plaintiff testified:
That he had been on per diem three-fourths of the
time bt•tween January 1, 1966, and the date of trial,
June 21, 1966 (R. 24). That he receives ten cents per
mile for each mile he operates his automobile on company business, in addition to the per diem. As a civil
service employee, he receives a periodic increase in his
income (R. 24).
He stated that he does not pay any attention to
whether he is raised in grade each time there is an automatic increase ( R. 25).
He stated that he doPs not know what his annual
income is. Before his last increase, his gross income was
$:-l,241. 00 ( R. 26) .
Exhibit D-1 was put into t•vidence. Exhibit D-1
~hows that his annual incollw, ·witl10nt per diem or auto1nohi If' allowance, was $8,495.00.
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He stated that he supposed the children would like
it very much if he were living at home with them (R. 28).
On the matter of quarreling, he stated that the only
thing is that she has felt that she didn't have enough
money to pay her bills each month. She yelled and
screamed at the children. She was a sloppy housekeeper

(R. 29).
He was then asked the following question and gaw
the following answer:
"But as far as you can answer us, Mr. Christensen, the quarreling was over money, and you and
she both started those matters, is that correcff'
A. "That's right." (R. 29-30)
He was asked the follo"\\ring question and gave the
following answer:
"Did she ever come right out and say to you,
Mr. Christensen, you were not a good provided''

A.

"In those words 1"

Q. "Yes."
A.

"I cannot say." (R. 31)

Plaintiff stated that the Defendant spent an unusual
amount of time in bed. He was asked how that affected
his marital life and he stated:
"vVell, I ratht>r enjoyed it because when she was
in hed then she wasn't np arguing with me or thl'
kids. I prepared the breakfast for the childre'.'.
morP than she did during their younger years.
(R. 34)
8

Plaintiff stated that since June, 1965, when he was
in court before, he had paid $300.00 a month for the
snpport of the children (R. 35).
Defendant was called and testified as follows:
Prior to 1958 the parties had a good marriage. Prior
to that time they did not quarrel seriously (R. 36). The
source of quarreling was attitudes about where the money
slionld go and was the primary source of the quarreling
(R. 37).

The Defendant stated:
"I didn't ever feel that Chris was a poor provider
and I never accused him of it. I always tried to
go to work and assist when we would get into a
pinch, and I tried to choose work that would keep
me at home with the children so the children were
not jeopardized by my being away from home."
(R. 37)
She further stated that she did not try to get fullt1me employment in 1961. She had just been fired for
absenteeism and it wasn't physically possible for her to
take full-time work (R. 38).
She further stated:
"My disability was partly from the menopause
and partly what they call decompensation with
edema. It is a thing people get when they have
a bad heart. They swell up. The body fills with
fluids." (R. 38)
stated that she worked part time in 1962 and
19G3. ~he found that as the years went by she was in1'!'1·a::-;ingly unable to work. In 1964 she worhd part time.
~he
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She earned $1,053.27 from January 1, 19GG, to June 16,
1966 (R. 39).
At the time of the trial, she was self-employed as a
public stenographer (R. 40).
She stated that the home was in a bad state of
neglect. The counter tops in the kitchen and linoleum
in the kitchen and bathroom need to be replaced. The
tile in the bathroom has come off. Plaster behind tlit
tile needs to be replaced. Paint is peeling in the inside
of the house (R. 43).
The Defendant testified that she had been obliged
to borrow $999.00 from her mother and sisters between
January 1, 1966, and June lG, 1966. Expenses were
$519.40 per month between said dates.
Mr. Christensen had paid her $200.00 a month and
her take-home pay was $163.00.
She stated that she has no desire for a divorce (R.
44). The children are heart-broken. The Defendant
stated that she would make an t:>ffort to make a happy
home (R. 45).
On cross-t:>xamination she stated the quarrels stemmed from the use of the money. Over the years he wa~
living home, they expended more than $600.00 a month
(R. 4G). ThPse years we were making more than $1,000.00
a month between us (R. 47).
As Ionµ: as I was able to make tlw money then
wasn't tl11: quarreling that therP usually was. I do not
10

,, yell and scream at the children. I did not yell at these
children unless they needed to be disciplined. We have
a good spirit in our home (R. 47).

She stated that she was not able to take a full-time
job at the time of the trial (R. 54).

·~

When I asked him why a man who uses garments
wonld need shorts, he became furious and said I was
accnsing him of adultery. The word was neYer mentioned
by IlH~ ( R. 54-55).
At the conclusion of the hearing the Court stated:
"Mr. Iverson, the Court has permitted this matter
to be heard further on its merits." (R. 56)
The following discussion took place between counsel
and the Court :
"The Court: Well, Mr. Iverson, the home was
awarded to her. She can sell it any time she desires.
"Mr. Iverson: Yes, but when she has spent what
there is in that and she isn't able to work, she
is on relief.
"The Court: Well, this court is not going to sad<lle this plaintiff under the facts of this case with
a permanent award for alimony." (R. 58)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECREE A WARDING PLAINTIFF A DIVORCE
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT
THAT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The finding of facts pHti1wnt to this matter reads:
11

"4. Defendant has treated Plaintiff cruelly, caus
ing him great mental distress in that she ha
constantly over a period of years provoked quar
rels with the Plaintiff, continuing to belittle hill
as a provider for the family; failed to keep 2
proper home, and has constantly quarreled witl1
the children of the parti<>s. Such conduct on d0
fendant's part has destroyed the legitimate object,
of matrimony."
[n essence, the grounds for the divorce are:

1. Defendant provoked quarrels with the plain. '
tiff.
2. Belittled him as a provider for the family.
3. Failed to keep a proper home.
4. Constantly quarreled with the children of the
parties.
Concerning the matter of her provoking quarrels
with the Plaintiff, the following testimony is in point:
Plaintiff at the first trial (R. 7) stated:
"We have both over a great many years worked
up an antipathy toward each other - name·
calling, and just hard feelings and constant fight·
ing· and bickering."
In the second hearing he was asked who started th1•
quarrels, to which he answered:
"\Vell, I would say that she would. She would
probably contend that I would start them." (R. GI
He said throughout the trial that the main diffi
cnlty was finances. He stated:
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"I would say that she was an erratic spender, a
compulsive spender. While she didn't spend
money on herself, she was very free with the children and gift-giving, things for the house, and I
didn't think she was a manager at all. We shifted
the responsibility of the money back and forth.
Never has been successful. Neither of us could
manage th<> money well, according to the other."
(R. 6)

He stated in answer to a question of how frequently
would they quarrel:

"It seems like it was a daily occurrence. Hardly

a day went by but what there wasn't arguing and
yelling, screaming back and forth and name-calling, mostly on my part, because I was incited to
wrath, I would say." (R. 8)
Concerning the matter of belittling the Plaintiff as
a provider, when asked what he meant by belittling in
public he stated:
"I can't give you examples, specific examples.
However, when we would go out to dinner there
would always be snide little cutting remarks directed at me."
His attorney then stated:
"You have got to bP specific. You have got to
tell me what they were and what she said or the
substance."
A. "I am unablt• to do that. I am sorry, I can't.
So many years have gone by since I have ever
been in the house."
Q. "Has Mrs. ChristensPn ever used abusive language toward you?"
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A. "No, she has not. But I have toward her,
am sure of that." (R. 12)

J

11

c
The Plaintiff was asked the following question ani f
gave the following answer:

''But as far as )'On can answer us, Mr. Christen
sen, the quarreling was over money and you and
she both started those matters, is that correctl 1
A.

"That is right." (R. 29-30)

He testified that they had an argument over th1
purchase of a jacket for their son, Robert, three or fom
years ago; that she wante>d to pay more than wm
necessary. He was asked if he was aware that four yean
after the jacket was purchased it was still in use, anu
if he thought she paid too much for it. He answered nn
( R. 31). This was the only i tern testified to by tli~
Plaintiff as being too expensive.

t:

h
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h
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He was asked the following questions and gave th1' {
following answers :

f

"Did she ever come right out and say to you, Mr.
Christensen, you are not a good provider?"
A.

"In those words?"

Q.

"Yes."

A.

''{cannot say." (R. 31)

rriwre was considerable discussion concerning an

incidvnt in which Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant
had call(·d him an adulterer. Apparently the trial court
did not h<·li<>vP the plaintiff in this rnattt:•r because ther1
14
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is nothing in the Findings of Fact in this matter. Concrrning this matter, the following question was asked and
the following answer was given by the Plaintiff:
''The only inforence was that you were not doing
what you had promised to do, isn't that all she
was discussing with you 1"
A. "I don't know what she was saying." (R. 32)
Plaintiff testified that Mrs. Christensen more often
than not did not get np in the morning until after he
had gone to work, and that she spent more time in bed
than most people spend on their jobs. He was asked
how this affected his marital life and he answered:
''I rather enjoyed it because then she was in bed,
then she wasn't up arguing with me or the kids."
(R. 34)
Apparently the Plaintiff gave no consideration to
the facts that she was not well, was working out to help
finance the family, and was keeping the house (R. 37).
But since he enjoyed the fact that she remained in bed
at times, he has nothing to complain about.
Recapitulating the evidence of the Plaintiff on the
matter of his grounds for divorce, we find the following:
"I would say that she would start the quarrels.
She would probably contend that I would start
them." (R. 6)
"I would say she was an erratic spender, compulsive spender. \Vhile she didn't spend money on
hrrself, she was n>ry free with the children and
gift-gi,·ing, things for tlH' house, and I didn't think
she was a manager at all. \Ve shifted the responsihil i ty of the money haek and forth. Never has
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been successful. Neither of use could manage the
money well, according to the other." (R. 6)
"Hardly a day went by but what there wasn't ar.
gning and yelling, screaming back and forth, and
name-calling, mostly on my part beeanse I waf
incited to wrath, I would say." (R. 8)

f
I
v

"Q. But as far as you can answer us, l\Ir. Chris
tensen, the quarreling was over money and yon
and she both started those matters, is that correct."

~

A.

n
h

"That is right." (R. 29-30)

"Q. Has Mrs. Christensen ever used abm;ive
language toward you?"
A.

"No, she has not, but I have toward her. I c
am sure of that." (R. 12)

Does the foregoing evidence, all from the Plaintiff,
support the findings of fact discussed under Point One!
Defendant submits that the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the trial court.
POINT II.
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO AW ARD
ANY ALIMONY IS A PLAIN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND A MANIFEST INJUSTICE OR INEQUITY IS WROUGHT.

A more apparent abuse of discretion is difficult to
imagine in such a matter as this. The Defendant hai
heen married to the Plaintiff for 26 years. She has borne
and raised five children (R. 4). Her health is not good
(H. 50, first tr.; R. 38, 39, 54, second tr.). At the tinll'
of trial her take-home pay was $163.00 and she wa'
r<>c0ivi11g $200.00 lWr month child support and no ali-
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he mony. She borrowed $999.00 during said
her bills (R. 44). Within less than one
.f.
d from Plaintiff will be $100.00 prr month
1
af Within six years he will be paying her
will then be 53 years of age.
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nothing. She

The Plaintiff stated that his healtl1 is fairly good
(R. 14, first tr.). At the time of the second trial, June
21, 1966, his annual earnings were, and no doubt still are,
unless he has received another raise, $8,495.00 (R. 26).
(D. Ex. 1, June 21, 1966).
At the time of trial, he was on per diem allowance
of $16.00 per day for every day he was out of Salt Lake
City. He testified that from January 1, 1966, to date of
trial, June 21, 1966, he was out of Salt Lake City threefourths of the time (R. 24). This means he was drawing
per diem of $16.00 at the rate of 273 days a year, or
$4,368.00 a year. His total salary and per diem was
$8,495.00 plus $4,368.00, or $12,863.00.
In addition, he is paid 10 cents per mile for each
mile he operates his automobile in the business of his
employer (R. 24).

At the conclusion of the hearing of June 21, 1966,
counsel for the Defendant and the Court had the following discussion:
The Court: "\Vt>ll, Mr. Iverson, the home was
awarded to her. She can sell it any time she desires."
Mr. Iverson: "Y('s, but when slw has ::;pent what
thr-r0 is in that and she isn't ahle to work, slw
17

is on relief. That is the thing that I am primarih
interested in in this matter, if it please the Court.

* * * Now, this is one case where it could easih
be in a comporatively short time that the Stat·e
of Utah would have another applicant for relief.
and if she goes on relief while he draws an incorm
of $8,000.00 or $9,000.00 a year and per diem ol
$16.00 a day for three-fourths of the year, I can
think of nothing more inequitable or unjust than
that. No reason why she should be reduced to
poverty." (R. 58)
The law applicable to a situation such as we ban
m this matter is discussed and settled by the case of
McDonald vs. llf cDonald, 236 P.2d 1066, 120 Utah 573.
Quoting from said case:

"It is true, as Plaintiff maintains, that this Court

has announced the doctrine that in divorce case~
it will weigh the evidence and may substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court. Dahlberg t'.
Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214; Hendricks t'.
llcndricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d 277. Neverthe·
less, this court should not do so lightly, nor merely
lwcause its judgment may differ from that of
th<> trial judge. vVe adhere to the qualifications
s<>t forth in the more recent expressions of this
eonrt: that the judgment will not be disturbeJ
unless the evidence clearly preponderates against
tlw finding of the trial court; or there has been
a plain abuse of discretion; or where a manifest
injnstiee or inequity is wrought. Anderson v. A1t
rlerso11, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252; Allen v. Alle11,
18
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109 Utah 99, 165 P.2d 872. * * *
The Court also stated:
"Such assets are sufficient to care for Defendant * * * and should keep her in ::mch fashion
that she will not become a charge upon public
authorities. Should Defendant's financial condition become such that she is in danger of becoming a public charge, the duty of support should
fall upon the Plaintiff and not upon the public
authorities. * * * In making the decree awarding
Defendant only the nominal sum of $10.00 per
year alimony, which ·was based on the then circumstances, Judge Van Cott expressly recited that
it was for the purpose of preserving her right
to alimony and directed that if danger of dependence appe>ared, the burden of her support would
fall upon Plaintiff and not upon others."

In the case of DeRose vs. DeRose, 426 P.2d 221, 19
Utah 2d 77, decided in April 1967, the Court stated:
''vVe remain cognizant of the prerogative of the
trial court and the latitude of discretion it is
properly allowed in divorce cases, but this discretion is not without limit nor immune from correction on review, if that is warranted. * * *
"Due to the seriousness of divorce proceedings
involving division of property and the vital effect
the decision has on people's lives, it is the responsibility of the Supreme Court to carefully survey
what has been done by the trial court."
The case at bar mon• ohvionsly justifies tlw interof this court than the case of D(:'Rose vs. Derose,
snpra.
po~ition
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In this casP it would bl' fair to a~ward tlw Defendan
$1.00 a month alimony until the child snpport is reducer!
to $100.00 a month, and at that time increase the alimom
to $100.00 per month, and fnrther increase the alimon:
to $200.00 per month when the child support is entire!:
eliminated, which will be within six years from the datt
of the last trial.
CONCLUSION
rrhe Defendant submits that the Court erred in
granting a divorce to the Plaintiff, and erred in refusin~
to grant periodic alimony in any amount to the De
fendant.

Respectfully submitted,
MOFFAT, IVERSON AND
TAYLOR

By J. Grant Iverson

